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still exist? Unfortunately, the courts answer this question in the
affirmative.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that any person performing
services for a municipality should take precautions to adhere to the
prescribed statutory procedure lest he endanger his possibility of
recovery.

THE PERMISSIVE AREA OF
STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS
INTRODUCTION
Since the "Civil Rights Cases"' many states have passed legislation
proscribing discrimination in various areas, including public accommodations, employment, and housing. The courts have coped with
various arguments, both ingenious and ingenuous, attacking the
validity of State "Fair Practices" Acts, but generally have sustained
the legislation.
However, increasing concern is being voiced by the proponents of
such state legislation in reaction to constitutional grounds raised in
two recent cases to be discussed later in this comment. The arguments raised have been stated within the framework of the wellknown and settled doctrines of "federal pre-emption," and the "negative implication doctrine," drawn from the plenary power of Congress
in the area of interstate commerce. But in reality the ratio decidendi
of these cases is the extent of permissible state action in areas where
the federal government has previously acted.
Although on the surface it would seem that the relation of these
doctrines to "Fair Practices" legislation of the states has been thoroughly delineated by the Supreme Court in Bob-Lo Excursion Company v. Michigan,2 the recent decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court, Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission and Marlon D.
Green v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.3 has again brought the problem
to the front.
The Civil Rights Act of 18754 generally declared that all persons
were to be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommo1.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

2.

333 U.S. 28 (1948).

3. (-Colo.-) 368 P.2d 970 (1962)
No. 68, 10/8/62, Docket No. 146.
4.

18 Stat. 335.

petition for cert granted, No. 146 and
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dations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other
places of public amusement, subject only to those legal limitations
applicable alike to all citizens of every race and color, regardless of
previous condition of servitude.
The above mentioned Civil Rights Act was attacked in the Civil
Rights Cases, and the Supreme Court held that these acts were beyond the power Congress had derived from the implementing clause,
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it was limited to arbitrary and discriminatory state action. However, the court decided
that discriminatory action was not in a no man's land, free from
regulation, but was in an area properly subject to state regulation.
Following the Civil Rights Cases considerable activity on the part
of the states resulted in anti-discrimination legislation in twentyeight states dealing with public accommodations, 5 in twenty-two
states dealing with employment, 6 and in relatively recent years in
seventeen states dealing with housing. 7 The housing area has shown
a particular propensity for growth, evolving from public housing to
urban renewal housing, to publicly assisted housing, and finally to
8
private housing.
In addition, the United States Commission on Civil Rights lists
about fifty municipalities that have passed various housing antidiscrimination acts. 9
CASES
Two recent cases have sharply pointed up the problems that are the
crux of this article. One case is Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division
Against Discrimination in State Department of Education.1 0 The
5. Public accommodations: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands also
have such statutes.
6. Employment: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

Washington, and Wisconsin.
7. Housing: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
8.
NEw YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE
PITTSBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE NO. 523.
9.

CODE

§ x41.10

as amended in

1961;

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, 1959 pp. 411 - 412,

REPORT, 1961, BOOK 4 ON HOUSING, pp. 200 - 201.
10. 31 N. J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960), appeal denied for lack of a substantial
Federal question. 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
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other case is Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission and Marlon
D. Green v. Continental Air Lines, Inc. 11
12
The Levitt case arose out of a complaint filed with the DAD
against corporate real estate developers, alleging racial discrimination in the failure to sell houses to the complainants. The developers
instituted actions in a state superior court challenging the jurisdiction of DAD.' 3 The State Superior Court dismissed the actions and
the Appellate Division upheld the dismissal. The corporate developers
appealed to the State Supreme Court, which affirmed the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court. The particular issue raised and
decided that is pertinent to this discussion was: whether Congress'
refusal to incorporate a policy of nondiscrimination in national housing legislation indicated federal pre-emption, thereby precluding
state action forbidding racial discrimination in federally assisted
housing. The New Jersey Supreme Court decided there was no preemption.
The Green case involved a complaint filed with the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Commission alleging that defendant airlines company
had unlawfully discriminated by refusing to employ the complainant
as a pilot because of his race. The commission found that the company had wrongfully discriminated and issued a cease and desist
order.' 4 The Colorado State District Court subsequently heard the
case on the merits of the original order and dismissed the case. The
ground for dismissal was federal pre-emption of the field through
the Civil Aeronautics Act and the Railway Labor Act.1 5 On appeal
to the Colorado State Supreme Court the District Court decision was
affirmed by a holding that state regulation of employment was a
burden on interstate commerce.
EVALUATION
The particular portion of the Levitt opinion which is germane to this
discussion was directed to the contention of the challenging party
11. Supra footnote 3.
12. Division Against Discrimination in State Department of Education.
13. The grounds upon which the developers based their objections were
based upon a construction of the statute term "publicly assisted housing accommodations" and the constitutionality of the statute itself.
14. Subsequently the Colorado District Court in and for the City and County
of Denver held the order defective on a formal ground. An attempt to substitute
a new order was held invalid by the District Court and its decision affirmed by
the Colorado Superior Court. The statute involved is COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 80-24 (1957).
15. District Court in and for the City and County of Denver, Colorado,
January 7, 1961, Civil Action No. B - 29648 (-P.2d-), 6 Race Relations L. Rep.
805 (1961).
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that "Congress as an integral part of its legislative program determined not to prohibit discrimination in the sale or lease of FHA
insured housing."' 1 6 Thus any state law having that effect would
violate congressional policy and the rule of pre-emption. The New
Jersey Court replied: "There is a considerable gap between Congress'
refusing to adopt an express policy of nondiscrimination in regard
to FHA insured housing to be applicable under all circumstances and
in all sections of the country, and a congressional policy prohibiting
7
It is
states from enacting laws proscribing such discrimination."'
of special interest to note the New Jersey Supreme Court's astute
recognition of extrinsic but pertinent circumstances as evidenced by
the statement: "Failure of Congress to incorporate into the National
Housing Act's a positive imposition of a policy of nondiscrimination
with its necessary national implications may be grounded in political
expediency to secure its enactment and, in any event, such a provision
would not account for local conditions and the effect of such a policy,
on a local basis, on the National Housing Program."' 9
The particular portion of the Green decision that is pertinent to
this article is found in this statement: "The Supreme Court of the
United States has clearly indicated that with reference to interstate
carriers the regulation of racial discrimination is a matter in which
there is a 'need for national uniformity,' and that the states are without jurisdiction to act in that area."' 20 The Colorado court relied
heavily upon Morgan v. Virginia,2 1 a case involving a Virginia
statute requiring segregated waiting rooms for interstate travelers.
In the Morgan case the statute was held unconstitutional as placing
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Colorado
Supreme Court also depended upon Hall v. DeCuir,22 an 1877 case,
where a state statute prohibiting discrimination on a boat engaged
in carrying passengers for hire between Louisiana and Mississippi
was held invalid as imposing a direct burden on interstate commerce.
A close look at both cases reveals that the arguments of federal
exclusion of state action rest largely upon implications to be drawn
from congressional silence or failure to act. In the Levitt case the
Fair Housing Act was involved; in the Green case it was the Interstate Commerce Act. Any attempt to imply from congressional
silence a national policy favoring segregation is difficult to sustain
16.
17.
18.
19.

31 N. J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, 188 (1960).
Id.
48 Stat. 1246, as amended.

21.

31 N. J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, 188 (1960).
(-Colo.-) 368 P.2d 970, 974 (1962).
328 U.S. 373 (1946).

22.

95 U.S. 547 (1877).

20.
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in the light of the expressions of the XIII and XIV Amendments. In
a recent California decision dealing with an anti-discrimination statute, Chief Justice Gibson said: "Discrimination on the basis of race
or color is contrary to the public policy of the United States and of
this State. Although the anti-discrimination provisions of the Federal Constitution relate to state rather than private action, they
nevertheless evidence a definite national policy against discrimina2
tion." 3
It is clear that states may not act inconsistently with valid federal
enactments. However, the area in which states may implement or
otherwise act consistently with federal legislation is not clearly
defined, as evidenced by the Levitt and Green decisions. It is submitted that state action that is not inconsistent with federal action
is always permissable unless a "need for national uniformity" exists.
The argument of pre-emption was dismissed rather summarily by
the Levitt court which found that other reasons may have dictated
Congress' refusal to accept statutory changes that would have expressly prohibited the discrimination charged. In the absence of
supporting decisions to sustain the "need for uniformity" the implication of pre-emption was not upheld. In contradistinction to the
situation of the Levitt case, the objection voiced in the Green case
was grounded in a strong line of supporting cases stemming from
Hall v. DeCuir, supra.
It is submitted that the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
demonstrated a rigid and doctrinaire approach that did not consider
such important factors as valid and pertinent United States Supreme
Court decisions, the historical context of the cases relied upon, or the
24
strong and rapidly growing policy against discrimination.
The primary case relied upon in the Green case was Hall v. DeCuir,
supra., in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
Louisiana anti-segregation statute 2 5 as applied to interstate carriers. As a secondary reference the Colorado Court presented a reiteration of the Hall v. DeCuir rationale in the Morgan case as standing for the proposition that a state may neither forbid nor require
segregation in reference to interstate carriers.
The cases cited in both the Colorado District Court and the Colorado Supreme Court proceed to show that the question of racial
discrimination by interstate carriers is, in and of itself, of such a
nature that national, uniform regulation by a single authority is
23. Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313,
317 (1962).
24. Ibid.
25.

LA. REV. STAT. 1870 p. 93.
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required. But every case cited deals with exclusion or regulation of
passengers on interstate carriers and the various courts stress the
inconvenience of changing seats, practical obstructions, and burdens
that result from diverse state regulations. Therefore, these cases
only stand for the proposition that racial discrimination by carriers,
as related to passengers, requires uniform legislation and do not lay
down a broad rule that state anti-discrimination action per se is an
unreasonable burden as applied to interstate commerce. However, at
no point does the Colorado court attempt to evaluate two Supreme
Court decisions, antecedent to the Hall v. DeCuir and Morgan cases
but very pertinent to any analysis of them, the Civil Rights Cases
and the Bob-Lo Excursion case.
The Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883, approximately six
years after the Hall v. DeCuir case. It is axiomatic that any reliance
upon the Hall v. DeCuir case must take into account the Civil Rights
Cases wherein Mr. Justice Bradley speaking for the Court said: "The
wrongful act of any individual, unsupported by any such authority
(state), is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an
invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they
affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned
in some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights
remain in full force and may presumably be vindicated by resort to
the laws of the state for redress."2 6 (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is
established that this is a proper area for state action. The Morgan
case was decided in 1946, and its holding, superficially, is tantamount
to a decision that any legislation in this area is forbidden insofar
as it applies to interstate transportation. But since the area has
previously been marked off as proper for state action the Morgan
case cannot be taken literally and must be interpreted as proscribing
only state regulation placing an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. Congressional action precludes state action only where
the repugnance is considered to be so direct and positive that the two
acts cannot be reconciled. 2 7 This analysis of the cases indicates that
the basic policy determination underlying judicial interpretation of
state anti-discrimination legislation is whether there is a "need for
national uniformity" that precludes any state action, consistent or
inconsistent. In 1948, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in the Bob-Lo case, an
appeal from an action pursuant to the Michigan Civil Rights Act, 28
referring to the appropriateness of state action in the face of admit26.

109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).

28. MICH. PENAL CODE §§ 146 - 148. MICH. CORP. LAW: §§ 17115 - 146 to
17115 - 148 (Supp. 1940), MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.343 - 28.346 (Cum. Supp. 1946).
27.

Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243 (U.S. 1859).
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ted foreign commerce, said: "It is far too late to maintain that the
states possess no regulatory powers over such commerce. From
the first meeting of Congress they have regulated important phases
of both foreign and interstate commerce, particularly in relation to
transportation by water, with Congress' express consent. And without such consent for nearly a hundred years they have exercised
like power under the local diversity branch of the formula announced
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299." 2 9 "Certainly there
is no national interest which overrides the interest of Michigan to
forbid the type of discrimination practiced here. And, in view of
these facts, the ruling would be strange indeed to come from this
Court, that Michigan could not apply her long settled policy against
racial and creedal discrimination to this segment of foreign commerce, so peculiarly and almost exclusively affecting her people and
institutions." 3 0 Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion said:
"This regulation would not place a burden on interstate commerce within the meaning of our cases. It does not impose a regulation which discriminates against interstate commerce or which, by
specifying the mode in which it shall be conducted, disturbs the uniformity essential to its proper functioning, see Southern Pacific Co.
'3 1
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761; Morgan v. Virginia, supra."
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge clearly affirms the
Civil Rights Cases and just as clearly refuses to recognize the
rationale drawn from the Morgan decision by the Colorado Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion comments decisively
on the question most pertinent to our analysis and decides that such
regulation would not place a burden on interstate commerce within
the meaning of the cases, and cites Morgan as authority for this
proposition.
32
The United States Supreme Court in Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi
said, ". . . Congress must clearly manifest an intention to regulate
for itself activities of its employees, which are apart from their
governmental duties, before the police power of the state is powerless." 3 3 Obviously where the employees are not federal employees,
but merely employees of a private organization subject to Congress'
regulation, the pre-emptive intent must be doubly clear.

29.

333 U.S. 28, at 37 (1948).

30.
31.
32.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
326 U.S. 88 (1945).

33.

Id.

at 97.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, I believe that the Colorado Supreme Court's narrow
view of the Morgan case and reliance upon Hall v. DeCuir was unjustified in view of the clear delegation of actions for redress of discrimination by individuals to state authorities in the Civil Rights
Cases decision. In the Minnesota Rate Cases, the U. S. Supreme Court
said: "It has repeatedly been declared by this Court that as to those
subjects which require a general system or uniformity of regulation,
the power of Congress is exclusive. In other matters, admitting of
diversity of treatment according to the special requirements of local
conditions, the states may act within their respective jurisdictions
until Congress sees fit to act; and, when Congress does act, the exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation." 3 4
Since state regulation has generally been permitted in matters of
interstate commerce which are local in nature, certainly the regulation of hiring of individuals who merely operate in interstate commerce would impose no greater burden. In the light of the existing
case law a determination that a state anti-discrimination act is invalid on the basis of federal pre-emption or as a burden on interstate
commerce must be grounded in a subsidiary finding of a need for
national uniformity. The Colorado Supreme Court's finding that the
area of racial discrimination with reference to interstate air transportation has been withdrawn from state regulation is too broad
and cannot be sustained. The recent decisions stemming from Brown
v. the Board of Education;3 5 the 1961 ICC ruling banning discrimination in waiting rooms;36 the Presidential Executive Orders 1092537
and 11063; 38 and the widespread prevalence of state anti-discrimination statutes are sufficient to indicate that the statutes in question
actually aid an already existing national policy.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has denied an appeal
of the Levitt decision for lack of a substantial federal question, but
has granted a petition for certiorari by the complainants in the
Green case.
34.

230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913).

35.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).

36. 26 Fed. Reg. 9166 (1961) (Regulations governing discrimination in
operations of interstate motor common carriers of passengers).
37. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961)
dent's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity).

(Established Presi-

38. Exec. Order No. 11063, November 20, 1962, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2259 (1962)
(Banning racial and religious discrimination in sale or rental of federally owned,
operated, or financed housing).

